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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyse misleading advertising competition between private firms (profit 
oriented) and consumer-oriented firms (concerned about consumer welfare) in the context of 
mixed markets. The nature of advertising in this paper is assumed to be non-rival in nature and 
is beneficial to all the firms in the market. We find that, both private and consumer-oriented 
firms incur positive expenditure on misleading advertising. Further, the profit of consumer-
oriented firms is higher than that of private firms. Moreover, irrespective of whether firms are 
concerned about consumer welfare or not, the level of misleading advertising is socially 
excessive.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper analyses the misleading advertising competition between private firms (profit 
oriented) and consumer-oriented firms, followed by product market competition (i.e. Cournot 
or quantity setting). The motivation for this study is to extend and validate the findings of 
Matsumura and Sunada (2013) and Pi et al. (2017), who analyse misleading advertising in a 
mixed market with public and private firms. We extend this analysis by substituting a public 
firm with a firm which is consumer-oriented (measured by consumer welfare) but differs from a 
public firm in that it is also concerned about its competitors’ profit and consumer surplus. 
Examples of such entities include some of the public sector firms in developed and developing 
countries, firms in the health sector (trust hospitals), co-operative firms such as AMUL in India 
and so on. Further, the objective function of a firm concerned about consumer surplus could 
also be used to analyse the case of firms with a focus on both profit as well as consumer social 
responsibility either for strategic or non-strategic reasons (Sharma 2018; Bian et al., 2016). The 
primary objective for this study was to analyse whether consumer oriented firms would not only 
stay away from misleading advertising but also deter other firms in the market from engaging in 
such activities. In contrast to  our expectations and in line with earlier studies in the context of 
mixed markets (Matsumura and Sunada, 2013; Hattori and Higashida, 2012) we find that a 
consumer-oriented firm also engages in aggressive advertising competition. 
This paper deviates from the traditional literature on advertising competition and its welfare 
outcomes in two ways. First, we assume that firm advertising is non-rival in nature. This means 
that advertising is of a more generic nature.  In other words, positive advertising done by one 
firm affects the market outcomes in terms of increased consumer valuation of the products sold 
by all the firms as well as positively affecting demand (Crespi and Marette, 2002). So advertising 
done by any firm is beneficial to all.  There are a handful examples of such advertising in 
Tobacco Industry (Pierce et al. 1998), Airline Industry (i.e. destination advertising) and so 
forth2. Further, we assume that advertising provides some information that is persuasive but can 
be either misleading or cautionary. Thus, it does not increase the utility of consumers but 
creates a perception of increased value for the product (Dixit and Norman, 1978).  
                                                        
2For more discussion on this, please refer to Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010). 
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Second, we consider advertising competition between private (profit oriented) and consumer-
oriented (consumer welfare oriented) firms, which to the best of our knowledge has not been 
analysed so far in the theoretical literature on advertising. In the mixed market, the orientation 
of firms lies between the extremes of own profit to social welfare comprising of total profit of all 
firms (i.e. producer surplus) as well as consumer surplus of all consumers. The orientation of the 
consumer-oriented firm remains to its own profit along with the welfare of the consumers. Thus 
these firms are different from public firms in the sense that they are not concerned about the 
rival firm's profit and different from private firms in the sense that their objective is own profit 
as well as consumer surplus optimization. These firms are also termed consumer cooperatives 
(Kopel and Marini, 2014), CSR oriented firms (Bian, Li and Guo, 2016) and consumer-oriented 
commercial firms (Goering, 2008) in the literature. There is empirical evidence to suggest that 
these firms do compete with private firms in some sectors of the economy (Goerke, 2003). 
The empirical evidence of advertising competition between private and consumer-oriented firm 
have been widespread across different sectors. One example is National Cancer Institute and 
Kellogg Company's All Bran Cereal Campaign in 1984 (Freimuth, Hammond and Stein, 1988). 
The campaign had a positive impact on not only consumer's perception and dietary habits but 
also on the profit of Kellogg. The entry of consumer-oriented firms in advertising or in a broad 
sense in marketing is termed as Social Marketing in the relevant literature3.  
In this paper, we attempt to analyse the market outcomes in the wake of the interaction of these 
two aspects of firms and nature of product markets i.e. nature of advertising competition and 
orientation of firms, as discussed above. Firms compete in a mixed market by choosing the level 
of advertising expenditure and quantity produced/sold in a simultaneous move product market 
competition (Cournot game). 
The main results are as follows. First, we show that non-rival misleading advertising is socially 
excessive in case of mixed market competition between profit-oriented and consumer-oriented 
firms. This finding is in line with Matsumara and Sunada (2013)4, who consider the case of a 
public and a private firm. Thus, we highlight that a relatively less strict nature of social 
orientation of the firm does not change its spending on excessive misleading advertising. 
                                                        
3See Andreasen (1994) for a detailed discussion on this. 
 
4 Though, it is not always the case that in a mixed market with socially concerned firm or public firm, 
there would be positive and excessive advertising. Pi et al. (2017) show that in a Stackelberg setting, public 
firms actually have negative level of advertising (corrective instead of misleading) to counter the 
misleading information from the private firms in the market. 
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Second, we show that there seems to be a case of free riding in the spending on  advertising. We 
show that with increased consumer-orientation of firm 2, there is an increase in the advertising 
level of firm 2 but firm 1 decreases its level of advertising. This is a new finding. Lastly, we show 
that as firm 2 increases its level of consumer-orientation, it is likely to be more aggressive in the 
market with higher profit than firm 1. However, beyond a threshold the profits of firm 2 become 
negative. The reason is excessive production and excessive advertising expenditure incurred. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the basic model. In 
section 3, we solve the game using backward induction method and discuss the implications of 
the findings. Section 4 focuses on the socially optimal level of advertising and whether it differs 
from the market outcome or not. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. BASIC MODEL 
 
We consider a mixed market duopoly where a private (profit oriented) firm competes with a 
consumer-oriented (own profit and consumer welfare oriented) firm. Let’s say, Firm 1 is a 
private firm and Firm 2 is a consumer-oriented firm. While the private firm maximises its own 
profit i.e. 𝜋1𝐶; the consumer-oriented firm maximises the weighted sum of its own profit, 𝜋2𝐶 
and consumer surplus 𝐶𝑆. We consider a two stage game where at the first stage, both the firms 
choose the level of advertisement , 𝑒𝑖 ∈  (−∞, ∞) simultaneously with advertising cost of 
quadratic nature i.e. 
𝑒𝑖2
2
, where 𝑖 = 1,2. We assume that the level of advertising can be either 
negative or positive5. Since the advertising is of non-rival nature, it affects the overall demand 
function by the level, m =  𝑒𝑖 = 2i=1 𝑒1 + 𝑒2.  At the second stage, after observing the level of 
advertisement in the market i.e. 𝑚, each firm decides the level of output to be produced/sold, 𝑞𝑖 ∈   0 , ∞  of a homogenous good. The inverse demand function is given by p = 𝑎 + m − 𝑞𝑖2i=1 .6 We assume that firms have a symmetric constant marginal cost, 𝑐 and without any loss 
                                                        
5 By negative advertising, we mean advertising that negatively affects the value of the product purchased 
by the consumer. Such advertising is not an unheard of phenomenon. Some firms as well as government 
use this type of advertising to counter misleading adverts. 
 
6 The underlying utility function of the consumer for the inverse demand function is, 𝑈 =  𝑞0 + (𝑎 +
m)𝑞1 + (𝑎 + m)𝑞2 − (𝑞12+2𝑞1𝑞2+𝑞22)2 , with the income constraint being,  𝑦 = 𝑞0 + p𝑞1 + p𝑞2.  Please refer to 
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of generality, we consider it to be equal to zero. Further, market size is large enough than 
marginal cost i.e. 𝑎 > 𝑐 = 0. 
The objective functions of both the firms are as follows: 
Firm 1  private firm : Max𝑞1 , 𝑒1 𝐹1  = 𝜋1𝐶 =  𝑝𝑞1 − 𝑒122  (1) 
Firm 2  consumer − oriented firm : Max𝑞2 , 𝑒2 𝐹2  = 𝜋2𝐶 + 𝛽 CS =   𝑝𝑞2 − 𝑒222  + 𝛽[12 (𝑞1 + 𝑞2)2]    (2) 
Here, 𝛽 ∈ [0, 1] is the relative weight assigned to the consumer surplus in the objective function 
of consumer-oriented firm7. If  𝛽 takes the value one, then we say that equal weight is assigned 
to both own profit and consumer surplus by the consumer-oriented firm. If 𝛽 takes the value 
zero then it corresponds to the objective of the private firm. In this model, to ensure that the 
stability and second order conditions are satisfied, we should have 𝛽 < 3, which is satisfied 
based on our assumption about 𝛽. 
Lastly, before moving on to solve the stages of this game, we discuss about the impact of 
misleading advertising and how it is treated in the model. As discussed in the last section, we 
assume that advertising is of persuasive nature but does not create actual increase in the 
consumer surplus for the buyers of the product. Dixit and Norman (1978) argue that to analyse 
the welfare implications of such advertising, we should analyse the consumer surplus both ex-
ante and ex-post. This provides us with two measures of consumer surplus which we term as 
actual and perceived. While the actual consumer surplus ignores the changes in the product 
valuation due to misleading non-rival advertising; the perceived consumer surplus accounts for 
the impact of misleading advertising (Hattori and Higashida, 2012). The equations for actual 
and perceived consumer surplus are as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Singh and Vives (1984) for a detailed discussion on the properties of such utility and corresponding 
demand function. 
 
7 Please note that we have a lower and upper value restriction on consumer-orientation for the purpose of 
this study, i.e. to analyse the behaviour of firms that value the consumer surplus or in other words, have 
some social responsibility towards their consumers. The upper restriction on the value of 𝛽< 1 is under 
the assumption that though the firms are sensitive towards consumer surplus but do not value it more 
than their own profit i.e. still the commercial nature of the firms is equal or dominant characteristic 
visible from the objective function. In a more general context, the value of 𝛽 can take any value either 
positive or negative based on the varying orientations of firms. This aspect remains beyond the scope of 
this paper but can be considered for further work. 
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CSPerceived =  
1
2
 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 2  (3) 
CSActual =  
1
2
(𝑞1 + 𝑞2 − 2𝑚)(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) (4) 
Further, we also discuss about the socially optimal level of advertising and compare the 
consumer surplus changes in these conditions to provide a public policy and consumer oriented 
analysis of misleading advertising. 
 
3. EQUILIBRIUM AND COMPARATIVE STATICS 
In this section, we solve the Cournot game with product market and advertising 
competitionusing the backward induction method. We first solve the second stage i.e. product 
market competition assuming the level of advertisement as given and, then solve the first stage 
for the level of advertising.  
3.1 Quantity Competition 
Firm 1 (private) and Firm 2 (consumer-oriented) maximise their objective functions given in 
equation (1) and (2) respectively, assuming the level of advertising (own and rival firm's) and 
quantity produced by other firm as given. From the first order conditions of the constrained 
optimization, we get the reaction functions (i.e. first order condition) of both the firms as 
follows: 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 1 ∶   𝑞1 = 12 (𝑎 + 𝑚 − 𝑞2)  (5) 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 2  ∶   𝑞2 = 𝑎+𝑚−(1−𝛽)𝑞1(2−𝛽)   (6) 
A closer look at the reaction functions reveals some interesting effects of the joint level of 
advertising denoted by 𝑚 and consumer-orientation indicated by 𝛽. We will discuss their role in 
determining the equilibrium level of output for each firm subsequently. 
As advertising level of a firm is non-rival in nature, it affects both the reaction functions equally. 
For the sake of simplicity, if we assume that 𝛽 = 0, then the reaction functions of both the firms 
become symmetric i.e. 𝑅1:  𝑞1 = 12 (𝑎 + 𝑚 − 𝑞2) and 𝑅2:  𝑞2 = 12 (𝑎 + 𝑚 − 𝑞1). In this case the total 
level of advertising, 𝑚,  shifts both the reaction curves outwards (inwards) if the level of 
advertising is positive (negative) leading to increase (decrease) in the level of output being sold 
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in the product market. The reason being that consumers' valuation of the product increases 
therefore they are willing to pay higher price and firms would be willing to sell more8.  
Next, looking at the role of consumer-orientation (𝛽 > 0) of firm 2 in quantity competition, we 
observe that it only affects the reaction curve of the consumer-oriented firm (2) and the effect on 
private firm is channelized through the change in the output level of firm 2. We observe that 
both the intercept as well as slope of the reaction function changes due to consumer-orientation 
of firm 2. This leads to an outward shift of firm 2's reaction function affecting the output of firm 
1 negatively and output of firm 2 positively. This is in technical terms similar to Stackelberg type 
(sequential choice with leader and follower firms) equilibrium in product market but the 
reasoning remains altogether different. Interestingly, the value of 𝛽 = 1/3  provides a 
Stackelberg outcome in the game with firm 2 being the leader with half of the total possible 
output produced (monopoly level) and  firm 1 produces follower's output, i.e. one fourth of total 
market size (after factoring in the cost). This is one example, where in a simultaneous Cournot 
game, Stackelberg outcome is the equilibrium9. 
Lastly, solving the equation (5) and (6) for  𝑞1 and  𝑞2, we get the product market equilibrium as 
follows: 𝑝 =  1−𝛽  𝑎+m 
3−𝛽 ;  𝑞1 =   1−𝛽  𝑎+m 3−𝛽  and 𝜋1𝐶 =  𝑎+𝑚 2 1−𝛽 2 3−𝛽 2 − 𝑒122 ;   𝑞2 =   1+𝛽  𝑎+m 3−𝛽  and 𝜋2𝐶 =  𝑎+𝑚 2(1−𝛽2)(3−𝛽)2 − 𝑒222 .       (7) 
Proposition  1: i) The positive (negative) non-rival misleading advertising affects output 
  and prices of both the firms as well as their profit positively (negatively). 
ii) The consumer-orientation (𝛽 > 0)  of firm 2 in duopoly quantity 
 competition, leads to increase (decrease) in the output of 
consumer-oriented (private) firm and the equilibrium price in the 
market decreases. 
                                                        
8 As we will see subsequently in the quantity competition outcome, that both price charged and quantity 
produced/sold by each of the firms would increase due to level of advertising, keeping the consumer-
orientation being zero i.e. 𝛽 = 0 
9 See Basu (1995) and Sharma (2018) for such cases in the context of managerial (incentives) delegation 
by the firms in product market competition. 
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iii) With higher value of 𝛽 (higher consumer-orientation), the profit of 
firm 1(private firm) decreases whereas profit of firm 2 increases upto a 
critical value of 𝛽  ≤ 1
3
  and then starts decreasing. 
Lemma 1: At the optimal value of 𝛽 (i.e. 1/3) for profit maximization by consumer-
oriented firm, the consumer-oriented firm behaves like a Stackelberg 
leader and the private firm acts like a follower firm in product market. 
Proof:  For  𝛽 = 1/3, we observe that 𝑝 =   𝑎+𝑚 
4
;  𝑞1 =   𝑎+m 4  and  𝑞2 =   𝑎+m 2 . This outcome 
corresponds to the Stackelberg equilibrium in the product market with market size being, 𝑎 + 𝑚. 
Next, we solve the first stage of the game i.e. advertising competition. 
3.2 Advertising Competition 
In the first stage advertising competition, by substituting (7) in equations, (1) and (2) along with 
m =  𝑒𝑖 = 2i=1 𝑒1 + 𝑒2,  we get: 
Firm 1  private firm : Max, 𝑒1 𝐹1  = 𝜋1𝐶 =   𝑎+𝑚 2 1−𝛽 2 3−𝛽 2 − 𝑒122  (8) 
Firm 2  consumer oriented firm : Max 𝑒2 𝐹2  = 𝜋2𝐶 + 𝛽 CS =   𝑎+𝑚 2(1+(2−𝛽)𝛽)(3−𝛽)2 − 𝑒222 (9) 
By differentiating with the level of advertising for each firm, the first order conditions i.e. 
advertising reaction functions (ARF) of firms are as follows: 𝐴𝑅𝐹1:      𝑒1 = 2(1−𝛽)2(𝑎+𝑒2)7−𝛽(2+𝛽)  (10) 
      𝐴𝑅𝐹2:     𝑒2 = 2(1+(2−𝛽)𝛽)(𝑎+𝑒1)(1−𝛽)(7−3𝛽)  (11) 
It is clear from equations (10) and (11), that level of advertising by both the firms is strategic 
substitute to each other i.e. 
𝑑𝑒2𝑑𝑒1 > 0 . Further, a positive increase in the value of 𝛽 i.e., consumer 
orientation, leads to decrease in the level of advertising for private firm and increase in the level 
of advertising for consumer-oriented firm. 
The equilibrium outcome of the game after advertising competition stage is as follows: 
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Price in the market: 𝑝 = 𝑎 − 2𝑎
(5−𝛽)      (12) 
For firm 1:  𝑞1 =  𝑎 − 2𝑎(5−𝛽), 𝜋1𝐶 = 𝑎2(7−𝛽(2+𝛽))(5−𝛽)2 , 𝑒1 =  2𝑎(1−𝛽)5−𝛽    (13) 
For Firm 2: 𝑞2 =  𝑎(3−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(5−𝛽)(1−𝛽) , 𝜋2𝐶 = 𝑎2(7−𝛽(14+𝛽(12+𝛽(−14+3𝛽))))(5−6𝛽+𝛽2)2 , 𝑒2 =  2𝑎(1+2𝛽−𝛽2)5−6𝛽+𝛽2  (14) 
The second order and stability conditions are satisfied if 𝛽 < 3. 
First, from (12), it is clear that price is affected negatively (
𝜕𝑝𝜕𝛽 < 0) by the consumer-orientation 
of firm 2. Therefore, an introduction of consumer-orientation parameter in this game leads to 
reduction in the equilibrium price in the mixed market. The reasoning for this is as follows. A 
higher value of 𝛽 emphasizes that consumer surplus be given more importance in the decision 
making which is positively dependent on the total output being sold in the market. This leads to 
reduction in the price being set in the market.  
Second, the quantity sold by firm 2 always remains more than firm 1 for any positive value of 𝛽, 
which is the implication of the consumer-orientation of firm 2. The marginal effect of increase in 𝛽  parameter is negative (positive) on output of firm 1 (firm 2). We can say that consumer-
orientation leads to higher output and lesser prices in the market.  
Third, in the equilibrium, profit of firm 2 is more than firm 1 if 0 < 𝛽 < 0.097, otherwise for any 
larger value of 𝛽, there is a role reversal in terms of profit.  We also observe that profit of firm 1 
always remains positive irrespective of any non-negative value of 𝛽, but this not the case for firm 
2.  The profit of the firm 2 remains positive if 𝛽<0.42, beyond which profit become negative.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Lemma 2:  i) Consumer-oriented firm has a higher profit than private firm below a 
threshold value of 0 < 𝛽 < 0.097. 
ii) Consumer-oriented firm has a lower profit than private firm for value of 𝛽 
between 0.097𝑎𝑛𝑑 0.42. 
  iii) Consumer-oriented firm has a negative profit beyond the threshold value of  
  𝛽 = 0.42. 
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Lastly, coming to the equilibrium level of advertising, we observe that both the firms have 
positive level of advertising irrespective of the consumer-orientation of firm 2. It means that for 𝛽 = 0, since both the firms have profit maximizing objective they both spend positively on 
advertising i.e. 𝑒1 = 𝑒2 =  2𝑎5  , in a homogenous product market. One should note that even 
though the advertising is  non-rival in nature i.e. having perfect positive externality for the other 
firm, both firm have positive level of advertising, indicating that there is a unilateral incentive 
for either of the firms to spend on advertising. Now, when 𝛽 > 0, we observe that level of 
advertising by firm 2 (𝑒2) is always more than firm 1 (𝑒1).  
Further, we have 
𝜕𝑒2𝜕𝛽 > 0 and 𝜕𝑒1𝜕𝛽 < 0.This indicates that consumer-orientation leads to increase 
in the misleading advertising for firm 2 and decrease for firm 1. Interestingly, the total amount 
spent on advertising in the market i.e. m =  𝑒𝑖 = 2i=1 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 , has first increasing and second 
decreasing component. Jointly, the effect of consumer-orientation ( 𝛽 ) on total level of 
misleading advertising is positive. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
As is evident from figure 2, consumer-oriented firm is more aggressive than the private firm in 
the advertising competition. This is a new result.  
Proposition 2: i) In the advertising competition, private and consumer-oriented firms 
have positive level of misleading and non-rival advertising nature.  
ii) Consumer-oriented firm remains more aggressive than private firm 
in the level of advertising.   
Proof: The explanation for this is as follows. A closer look at the effect of both the strategic 
variables on the objective functions of both the firms reveals that, if 𝑎 + 𝑚 > 0 (i.e. there is a 
market for the product) and when 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1/3 then,  
Firm 1:  
𝜕2𝐹1𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽   −𝑣𝑒 =  𝜕2𝜋1𝐶𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽   −𝑣𝑒  
Firm 2: 
𝜕2𝐹2𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽   
+𝑣𝑒 =  𝜕
2𝜋2𝐶𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽   
+𝑣𝑒 + 𝜕
2𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽       
+𝑣𝑒  
whereas, if 
1
3
< 𝛽 ≤ 1, then  
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Firm 1:  
𝜕2𝐹1𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽   −𝑣𝑒 =  𝜕2𝜋1𝐶𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽   −𝑣𝑒  
Firm 2: 
𝜕2𝐹2𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽   
+𝑣𝑒 =  𝜕
2𝜋2𝐶𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽   −𝑣𝑒 + 𝜕2𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝜕𝑚  𝜕𝛽       +𝑣𝑒  
Therefore, under any condition, a positive change in 𝛽 leads to negative (positive) change in the 
marginal effect of advertising on the profit of firm 1 (firm 2). It means that firm 2 always has an 
incentive to increase the level of advertising whereas firm 1 does not. That is why, firm 2 is more 
aggressive than firm 1. Moreover firm 1 decides to reduce the level of advertising with any 
positive change in 𝛽 i.e. consumer-orientation of the firm 2. 
In the next section, we discuss the welfare aspects of advertising and implications of its non-
rival and misleading nature. 
4. WELFARE ASPECTS OF MISLEADING ADVERTISING  
 
As suggested in Dixit and Norman (1978), to understand the welfare aspects of persuasive 
advertising, one should analyse the difference in the consumer surplus, pre and post change in 
the consumers’ tastes and preferences, due to advertising competition among the firms.  
In this section, we examine the nature of consumer surplus and social welfare in the 
equilibrium, followed by the socially optimal level of advertising while considering the consumer 
surplus i.e. either actual (without considering the distorted tastes and preferences) or perceived 
(i.e. after accounting for change in consumer taste and preferences). We also analyse whether 
the level of advertising in the mixed market is socially excessive or not. 
In the equilibrium of advertising competition, we observe that consumer surplus is as follows: 
CSPerceived =  
1
2
 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 2 =  2𝑎2(3 − 𝛽)2
(5 − 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)2 
CSActual =  
1
2
(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 2m))(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) = 2𝑎2(−3 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝛽)
(5 − 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)2  
As discussed earlier, the difference between actual and perceived consumer surplus is the 
adjustment for change in taste and preference of consumers (which we assume to be misleading 
in nature). 
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Looking at these values of consumer surplus, we can say that due to the persuasive advertising 
consumer believe that they get positive surplus irrespective of the fact that they are paying 
higher price for the good. On the other hand, after adjusting for the misleading level of 
advertising, we observe that actual consumer surplus becomes negative.  
This is an interesting result and holds irrespective of whether any of the firms have consumer-
orientation or not. We will come back to the role of consumer-orientation in affecting consumer 
surplus in the next subsection.  
Next, if we think from a social planner or a regulator's perspective, what should be the optimal 
level of advertising for the mixed market? In other words if the government is able to regulate 
the level of advertising what should be the first best choice? 
To answer this question, the social planner will optimally choose social welfare maximizing level 
of advertising. The problem of social planner is as follows: Max e  SW (e), where e is the level of 
advertising for both the firms. In this problem, social welfare would include profits of both the 
firms as well as consumer surplus. The consumer surplus to be considered here is the perceived 
consumer surplus.  
Social Planner: Max𝑒=𝑒1=𝑒2 SW𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑  = 𝜋1𝐶 +  𝜋2𝐶 + CS𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑
=
4 𝑎 + 𝑚 2 2 − 𝛽 − (3 − 𝛽)2𝑒12 − (3 − 𝛽)2𝑒22
2(−3 + 𝛽)2  
In the equilibrium, first best socially optimal level of advertising with perceived consumer 
surplus is: 
    𝑒𝑆𝑊𝑃 = − 4𝑎(2−𝛽)7−𝛽(2+𝛽) 
 
On the other side, if the social planner would have considered actual consumer surplus instead 
of perceived consumer surplus, then the optimization problem would be as follows: 
Social Planner: Max𝑒=𝑒1=𝑒2 SW𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  = 𝜋1𝐶 +  𝜋2𝐶 + CS𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
=
4 𝑎 + 𝑚  𝑎 2 − 𝛽 − m − (3 − 𝛽)2𝑒12 − (3 − 𝛽)2𝑒22
2(3 − 𝛽)2  
In the equilibrium the first best socially optimal level of advertising with actual consumer 
surplus is:  𝑒𝑆𝑊𝐴 = 2𝑎(1 − 𝛽)
17 − (6 − 𝛽)𝛽 
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Comparing the socially optimal level of advertising with the actual level of advertising done by 
the firms in mixed market, we get the following result: 
Proposition 3: Both private and consumer-oriented firms engage in socially excessive level 
of misleading advertising in the mixed markets, irrespective of whether we consider actual or 
perceived consumer surplus in social welfare. 
Proof:In our model, 𝑒𝑆𝑊𝑃 < 𝑒𝑆𝑊𝐴 < 𝑒1  and 𝑒𝑆𝑊𝑃 < 𝑒𝑆𝑊𝐴 < 𝑒2 , irrespective of the level of 
consumer-orientation (𝛽). This means that firms are spending socially excessive amount on the 
misleading advertising. QED 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of non-rival misleading advertising by firms on product 
market competition and equilibrium outcomes in a mixed market. We contribute to the 
literature in the following manner. First, we show that consumer-orientation leads to higher 
(lower) output for the consumer-oriented (private) firm. For a value of 𝛽 (consumer-orientation) 
below a threshold, a consumer-oriented firm can actually earn more profit than a private firm . 
This corresponds to a Stackelberg outcome with the consumer-oriented firm being the leader 
and the private firm behaving like follower. Second, we show that both firms spend excessively 
on non-rival misleading advertising and, interestingly, the consumer-oriented firm spends more 
than the private firm on advertising. Lastly, we demonstrate that both firms engage in a socially 
excessive level of advertising competition.  
This paper suggests that misleading advertising is not only restricted to private profit oriented 
firms but also observed in a mixed market. Moreover, even though a consumer-oriented firm 
might care about consumers surplus, it still engages in a race-to-the-top in advertising 
competition. 
There are several potential extensions to the analysis in this study. First, future research might 
explore the mechanisms (market and government interventions) by which the excessive level of 
misleading advertising in the market could be restricted. A second extension would be to analyse 
the differences in Cournot and Bertrand outcomes in the context of non-rival misleading 
advertising. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: Profits and Perceived Consumer Surplus (X-axis: 𝛽 and Y-axis: Profits and Consumer 
Surplus, we assume a=1 for this graphical depiction) 
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Figure 2: Level of advertising (Y-axis) and Non-profit orientation of firm 2 (X-axis)  
(We assume a=1 for this graphical depiction) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
